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Abstract
This paper focuses on the role of “institutions” in the fight against poverty and inequality. Our
view of institutions encompasses formal rules designed by polity (including those in the legal
and economics sphere such as rules of property rights, contracts and liabilities) as well as
informal rules (usually labelled social capital) that have emerged over the history of one’s
civilisation. The inclusion of health, nutrition, and literacy indicators in defining well-being
(or, non-income poverty à la capability approach of Amartya Sen) allows a rich discussion of
policy interventions. While both orientations as to the concepts of poverty, inequality and
institutions are expounded on a priori reasoning, empirical analysis with LAC data prove
rewarding. Quality of institutions (measured by a composite variable called institutional
capital, IC) turns out to be a key factor explaining well-being. Further where the level of
income is also important to the explanation, the quantitative role of the institutional factor
dominates that of the income variable. Within IC, political stability (or lack of violence)
appeared to provide the more precise estimates in every case. Consequently we argue that the
foremost policy interventions ought to be in the areas of building both adequate formal
institutions, as well as creating an enabling environment for the informal institutions (such as
social capital) to flourish and find their own roots. The principal focus of the policy debate
must centre on the mutual interaction of market as well as non-market institutions in reducing
poverty broadly speaking.
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1.  Introduction: Over the past two decades researchers and policy makers have
called for an expansion of the idea of poverty going beyond the income/expenditure
dimension. The idea of “basic needs” popularised by the World Bank scholars had been a
forerunner. A more vigorous effort started with the popularity of the idea of one’s
capability as being the relevant measure: poverty must be seen as the deprivation of basic
capabilities than merely as lowness of incomes (Sen 1999, p.87). Here one attempts to
measure how capable is the person to enjoy the kind of life that she cherishes (including
basic freedom). Over the decade of the1990s, this concept has led to innovations by the
UNDP when it devised the “human development index” in 1993, and finally the “human
poverty index” in 1997. Sen believes that this broadening of the concept enables one “to
enhance the understanding of the nature and causes of poverty and deprivation by shifting
attention away from the means ..to ends that people have reason to pursue, and,
correspondingly, to the freedoms to be able to satisfy these ends” (ibid, p90). 
In order to apply the capability approach to poverty and well-being analysis, one would
select indicators that capture critical aspects of mortality, nutrition, risk/vulnerability, the
lack of voice, political participation, etc. This paper develops a simple measure of non-
income aspects of poverty (NIP) or well-being along the above lines, which we believe
describes one’s understanding of general well being quite well.
1 Our analysis focuses
both on the aggregate as well as the individual components of well-being. Our stress on
the latter dimension of well-being is fully endorsed by Sen. While the measures of HDI
and HPI (human poverty index) have been popular, and where Sen himself has materially
contributed to the construction, he thinks that the aggregation is not helpful for the design
of policies. Instead the substantive pattern of diverse performances is called for in order
to pinpoint the areas where ideas and resources may have to be spent. Knowing where a
society stands in the aggregate would not reveal much of how to design policies, the latter
being of necessity of the targeted variety. Depending on the specific context, public
policies may have to target “the financing of health care and insurance, provision of
public education, arrangements for local security and so on” (Sen, 1999, p108). 
Over and above the policy angle, there are compelling analytical and practical
considerations that suggest that the broader measure of poverty ought to be the primary
focus in an analysis of poverty. The analytical point is indeed the raison d’être of the
capability idea. Capabilities are goals in themselves, regardless of whether or not these
also lead to income gains. Thus by directly targeting the broader notions of deprivation is
tantamount to maximizing the direct utility function, rather than relying on the indirect
utility (defined over income). The practical considerations are many. Klasen (2000) has
                                                
1 In this paper we shall use both the terms non-income poverty (NIP) and well-being synonymously, where
each denotes our concept of broader poverty.2
argued that the identification of the worse off in society in terms of the income measure
vis-à-vis those pointed out by the capability approach may differ importantly. In large
sample for South Africa, he found that 30 percent of the most deprived (NIP driven)
would not be so identified by the expenditure headcount method. This makes it difficult
for the design of targeted policies. Others point out that the income or the expenditure
data typically used for the headcount poverty analysis is unreliable (e.g., Wade, 2002).
Indeed there is a presumption here that the available NIP indicators were of better
quality.  
The primary goal of this paper is to explain the pattern of well-being across nations, and
contrast the results in terms of the typical determinants of the income/expenditure based
measures of poverty (such as the head count statistic). We do this for Latin America and
the Caribbean region (LAC). While inequality of income (consumption) has been
frequently pointed out as an important moderating force in explaining headcount poverty
(e.g., Ravallion, 2001), it would be of interest to examine if a similar pattern may hold for
the broader measure of poverty. This is especially relevant in view of the high level of
income inequality in many of LAC countries vis-à-vis other regions. 
The key focus of the analysis however lies in discerning the role that institutions à la New
Institutional Economics (NIE) play in determining broader poverty. The presumption is
that the quality of institutions has a direct bearing on the NIP indicators, and it would be
of interest to examine if these were statistically significant vis-à-vis the impact that
income differences have on the same indicators of poverty. It would seem that the nexus
between institutions and poverty has also been hinted at by Sen. Even though income
may have a direct bearing on the range of capabilities, he went on to say that “the impact
of income on capabilities is contingent and conditional” (p88). He further elaborates:
“different types of contingencies lead to systematic variations in the ‘conversion’ of
incomes into the distinct ‘functioning’ we can achieve” (p109). He stresses the role of a
“supportive social background” as relevant to the conversion process. In the larger view
proposed here, the supportive background might be likened to the totality of institutions
as developed below.
We begin by exploring how the selected countries
2 differ in the design, delivery and
endowment of “institutions”. Here we conceive of institutions as the enabling framework
that facilitates economic and other exchanges, both within and outside of the market
mechanism. The central focus of new institutional economics is that transactions are
costly to execute.
3 Indeed NIE makes a clear break from the Walrasian tradition by
asserting that co-ordination of transactions is never as easily accomplished as is implied
there. Matthews conceives of institutions rather generally as a “set of rights and
obligations affecting people in their economic lives” [1986, p905]. To North, institutions
are the “rules of the game” [1997]. Indeed he goes further: “institutions must not only
provide low-cost enforcement of property rights, bankruptcy laws, but also provide
incentives to encourage decentralised decision making and effective competitive
markets” [1997, p4]. Among “formal rules”, he enumerates the polity, the judiciary, and
the laws of contract and property.  
                                                
2 The essential methodology behind the selection of countries is that comparable data exist for the entire
set. Out of an initial sample of nearly 40, twenty-one survive. Most of these are from Latin America.  
3 Coase (1984) attributes the origin of the term “new institutional economics” to Oliver Williamson. 3
These above rules are complemented by what is generally referred to as “informal” ones.
For North, the latter are “extensions, elaborations and qualifications of rules that ‘solve’
innumerable exchange problems not completely covered by formal rules. ..Routines,
customs, traditions, and culture are words we use to denote the persistence of informal
constraints” [1997, p4]. Williamson defines the concept of “societal embeddedness” as
“antecedent to the polity and refers to societal features (norms, customs, mores, religion)
which differ among groups and nation states and operate as societal supports, or lack
thereof, for credible contracting” [1998, p77]. Indeed von Hayek collectively described
conventions, “as part of cultural evolution of mankind” (1945, AER, cited by Kaufer,
1984). The norms and customs are collectively called social capital, and have been
popularized in the development literature (e.g., see Coleman, [1988] and Collier [1998].
Indeed without labelling it so, Kenneth Arrow may have been the first economist to muse
on the possible role of social capital in helping agents allocate resources, and hence
overcome the market deficiencies. In a rather illuminating, though short, section of his
1970 paper on the choice of market vs. non-market allocation, he argued: “Norms of
social behaviour, including ethical and moral codes”, may be interpreted as, “reactions of
society to compensate for market failures” (1970, p70). Arrow singled out the norm of
mutual trust as one capable of serving the non-market allocative power alluded to above.
He noted that “in the absence of trust, it would have been very costly to arrange for
alternative sanctions and guarantees, and many opportunities for mutually beneficial co-
operation would have to be foregone” (ibid. p70).
Further, we note that the use of the somewhat diffused term of governance in modern
policy discussions also originates in the NIE literature. It relates to institutions that a
society must possess in order to monitor the "plays of the game". Williamson argues that
“transaction is the basic unit of analysis and regards governance as the means by which
order is accomplished in relation to which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset
opportunities to realise mutual gains” (1998, p76). Conflicts in exchange may occur due
to asset specificity of agents (“bilateral dependency”) or wherever contractual hazards
may arise. 
Further, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society groups may be viewed
upon as also facilitating exchanges both in the ex-ante sense or in the ex-post (i.e.,
governance/monitoring) role, acting directly or reinforcing the existing stock of social
capital. Indeed one of the theoretical points that the paper makes is in constructing a
hierarchical framework where all the principal institutional elements (both rule making
ones as well as those engaged in monitoring) may be arranged and explained. The
resulting construct, namely the totality of institutions, would serve as a general
framework of “institutional capital” (IC) as relevant for analysing the process of
economic development and of economic activities in general.
4 We thus measure how the
differences in the “institutional capital” (IC) have affected the poverty profile of the
countries in question. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we provide a brief outline of the
recent literature on growth and poverty, and relate this to the Latin America/ Caribbean
                                                
4 While arguments presented below are brief, a fuller exposition of the idea is contained elsewhere (Ahsan,
2002a).4
context. We also probe the kind of testable hypotheses that one may derive from this
review. In section 3, we discuss methodological issues of measurement, especially in
light of data availability. Section 4 reviews the empirical findings, while section 5
concludes. 
2. Growth, Poverty and Institutions
(a)  Growth and Poverty: While the focus of the present paper is in explaining the
non-income dimensions of poverty, the analytical methods essentially derive from the
better-known literature on growth and income poverty. It is therefore necessary to dwell
on the latter research in order to hypothesise the kind of testable propositions that emerge
there. Turning to this task, it indeed appears that we seem to lack a received theory of
how growth leads to poverty reduction. Evidently the growth process brings about
changes in the underlying income distribution. Since estimating the entire distribution is
hard, one focuses on indicators such as Gini or other intuitive measures of dispersion.
Head count poverty as stated above, is simply given by H = F(z), where z is the poverty
line, and F(x) denotes the cumulative density of income behaviour. Thus H would denote
all whose income or consumption falls below z, and hence are treated as “poor”. 
Most work relating the growth process and income distribution does not typically focus
on the headcount measure, instead on measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient.
Using both cross-section and time series data, Simon Kuznets (1963) had discovered an
inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and growth. At the early stages of
growth, he reasoned, as urbanisation and industrialisation get underway, inequality rises
with growth. However, as industrialisation gathers pace, vigorous absorption of rural
migrants in the urban sector helps reduce income inequality. Indeed Aghion et al (1999)
suggest that the history of industrial revolution and beyond (especially US, 1770-1970)
does bear this out, where over the first hundred years inequality rose, only to moderate
over the next hundred. 
However this view has been emphatically challenged by new empirical evidence that
proceeds along two related angles. Most immediate to the present discussion is the
observation that greater equality due to continued growth in the already industrialised
world (say OECD) appears to have been reversed in the last 25 years or so. The growth
process here operates, Aghion et al argue, along trade liberalisation, skill-based technical
changes, and organisational changes within the firm. The combined force of these
diffusions have impacted on growth such as to render the distribution of earnings
inequitable, and thus throwing doubt on the plausibility of the Kuznets process under
present conditions.
Poverty Elasticity of Growth: Datt and Ravallion (1992), showed that the change in
poverty,  ∆H, between two points in time can always be decomposed into a growth
component, and one measuring a change in the underlying distribution. This is mere
definitional. The growth part is usually represented by a horizontal shift in the density
function with an unchanged distribution, while the distributional change is described for
the new level of mean (relative) income. Indeed the poverty elasticity of growth
highlighted in the empirical literature focuses on the first of these two components. In
that context, Kakwani (1993) had analytically derived an elasticity for all poverty5
measures that satisfy the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke [FGT, 1984] class of functions.
5 The
headcount measure, H = F(z), extensively used in the literature is indeed a simple version
of the FGT poverty measure where the index of inequality aversion is set to zero. Since
the growth component in the decomposition amounts to a distribution neutral shift (in
relative income), the interpretation of the poverty elasticity is simple. The elasticity figure
merely yields the relative size of population who would cross the set poverty line due to a
one- percent increase in mean income. 
Inequality and the Poverty Elasticity:  It is an observed fact that growth seldom leaves the
underlying income distribution unaffected in the sense implied above. In view of the
latter difficulty, Bourguignon (2002) has recently examined the issue on the presumption
that income followed a lognormal distribution, which allows a greater degree of
tractability. In effect he characterises the Datt-Ravallion decomposition fully: 
(2.1) (∆H/H) = (-)ε(DEV,IIQ).GRO + β(DEV, IIQ).RIQ.
The rhs variables include the level of development (DEV, measured by the ratio of mean
income to z, the poverty line) and the change in inequality (RIQ, respectively).
6 The ε-
function is the (head count) poverty elasticity, which under the conditions of the
Bourguignon model, rises with DEV and decreases in IIQ, the initial level of inequality.
Indeed for the lognormal case, the elasticity has a simple closed form solution (eq 3' in
Bourguignon). The distributional change (measured by RIQ) is also accompanied by a
coefficient (β ), which itself is a function of DEV as well as IIQ, non-linearly in the latter
case. 
Growth-Poverty Empirics: While development theories have been scarce, there has been
a proliferation of empirical writings on poverty and growth of late. The standard result
from the (cross-section) analysis on the subject suggests that economic growth is
necessary, even though not sufficient, for income poverty to decline (Dollar and Kraay,
2001a, and Ravallion, 2001). Indeed these results suggest that the overall share of output
going to the poor remains, on average, largely unchanged with growth. Hence given
initial inequality, the share of the rich continues to remain disproportionately high vis-à-
vis the poor. Consequently, for any incremental growth, the per capita income gains by
the rich far outpace that by the poor. Ravallion (2001) also finds that persistent (and
rising) inequality may dampen the poverty elasticity of growth. On balance, however,
Chen and Ravallion (2001) have described slow growth itself as the "…far more
important reason for the low rate of aggregate poverty reduction than rising inequality
within poor economies" (p19).
Neither the analytical research on the poverty elasticity of growth nor the empirical
growth-poverty literature cited above attempts to explain growth itself. The growth-
inequality nexus follow from a related branch. Modern empirical growth literature
suggest that higher initial inequality hurts long-run growth [Alesina-Rodrik (1994),
Perotti (1993 and 1996), and Persson-Tabellini (1994)], which Aghion et al. (1999)
                                                
5 The FGT index is given by Pα (z,x) =∫[(z –x) /z )
α ]f(x)dx, for  z < x < 0, where α denotes the index of
inequality aversion.  
6 Bourguignon actually measures inequality by the standard deviation (s.d.) of the logarithm of income, but
switches to the Gini coefficient in empirical work for both the initial and the change levels. Evidently the
Gini is an increasing function of s.d. However, in this paper we measure inequality by the Gini coefficient. 6
interpret as repudiating the first arm of the inverted Kuznets-U. The type of inequality
one has in mind here is along the wealth dimension. These authors argue that the likely
explanation behind the result is that wealth inequality influences individual decisions in
human and physical capital, especially in the context of capital market imperfections and
moral hazard, and hence hurts aggregate growth. Modern (endogenous) growth theories
elaborate on this, and the contribution may be summed up by the following quote: “..the
less developed the credit markets and the larger the separation between borrowers and
investors, the bigger the scope of redistributive policies aimed at creating opportunities,
improving borrower’s incentives, and reducing macroeconomic volatility” (Aghion et al.
p.1631). Thus one would infer that high initial inequality would slow down poverty
reduction albeit indirectly, namely by slowing down growth. There also remains a
concern that the poor typically fare disproportionately worse over economic cycles.
To the extent one interprets the Kuznets hypothesis as suggesting that inequality would
promote growth, as some earlier theories had purported to do, current growth analyses
(both theory and estimations) would appear to be in direct contradiction.
7 Initial
inequality would appear to exacerbate the consequences of incomplete markets for
human, physical and financial capital in terms of the eventual returns accruing to firms
and individuals. We would thus expect initial inequality to play a role in the poverty
performance and on economic growth. The above reasoning would apply, a fortiori, to
the concept of non-income poverty developed below, which is directly related to the
human capital outcomes (mainly health and education) during the process of
development. 
The LAC Experience: Before examining how well the above analysis may relate to the
region at focus, let us briefly outline the poverty dynamics in the LAC region. The Latin
American region stands out as a region with both very high levels of poverty and
inequality. The initial inequality of earnings/expenditure, while significantly higher vis-à-
vis OECD countries, still differed a fair bit in the LAC region. While Brazil has the
dubious distinction of having the highest Gini in the region (63.4 as of 1990), lower rates
prevailed in Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay (low 40s).  While growth appears to be, on
average, neutral with respect to inequality at a global level, the Latin America-Caribbean
(LAC) experience is not very different.  Research by de Janvry-Sadoulet (2000) and
Psacharopoulos et al (1995) both find evidence that growth did reduce poverty, but not
inequality, and that further, the poverty reducing effect was muted by the incidence of
high inequality and vice versa.  
(b) The Non-Income Poverty (NIP): We have already outlined the recent emergence of a
broader conceptualisation of well-being that highlights non-income dimensions
prominently. Kanbur and Squire (1999) argue that NIP not only expands the set of
policies that are relevant to poverty reduction but also requires that the interactions
among such policies be recognised. They argue that the various dimensions of poverty
interact in important ways, such that “policies do more than simply add up” (p2). For
example, improving health of people increases their income-earning potential, and
                                                
7 However, one may interpret Kuznets hypothesis as merely suggesting an empirical regularity, without
necessarily being associated with a unique causal process.  Clearly the rationalisation behind Kuznets
process, even if verifiably true over some time period, is surely of an ad hoc nature! Also note that
Kuznets’ inequality is over all sources of income (labour and capital).7
increasing their education leads to better health outcomes, and so on. Thus poverty-
reducing strategies must recognise the interactions among polices. 
There is little in the literature that examines whether the growth-poverty (income)
hypotheses discussed above also extend to NIP. It would also be important to know if the
initial wealth distribution, which surely affects human capital as well as physical capital
investment possibilities most directly, plays a part in determining the level of broader
poverty. Similarly one would expect that the quality of economic, political and social
institutions, (as we measure via the IC concept discussed more fully below) also make for
greater access to health, educational, and physical (including public utilities)
infrastructure, and further are these effects comparable to that the income level has on
these same indicators. Hence we expect that the levelling of the playing field to have a
direct bearing in shaping the non-income poverty outcome for a given level of output
growth.
(c) Role of Institutions: The new institutional economics makes it very clear that
institutions (say, economic and political ones) are generally incomplete in any setting,
which implies that transactions are costlier than they ought to be under the full efficiency
paradigm. It is often heard that inadequate privatisation, wage-setting regulations,
reforms of pensions and transfers, functioning of markets for finance, and importantly on
the capacity of the state to collect revenue and carry through reforms are the primary
impediments. While the above are potentially significant, our approach to the concept of
institutional capital, as suggested above, is entirely different. We agree with the central
tenet of the NIE that low cost transacting is essential for economic growth. And the cost
of transactions varies a lot between alternative systems of institutions that prevail across
societies. Lower transaction costs, both in the economic as well as in the political sphere,
should in principle allow faster growth, and therefore affect the (income) poverty
outcome.
North makes a further point that the structure of transaction costs vary between political
and economic markets in any society whereby “high transaction costs issues gravitate to
the polity” (1990b, p362). Insofar as countries (e.g., in transition or developmental mode)
suffer from the incompleteness of their democracies, the following quote from North is a
useful reminder. “..It is political markets in non-democratic polities that urgently need
such transaction cost analysis. The far greater imperfections of such markets ..are the root
cause of their economic performance since it is polities which devise and enforce the
property rights that are the incentive structure of economies” (1990b, 364). One may
extend this further to advance that extensive public control (e.g., via SOEs), cumbersome
regulatory framework and weaknesses of the judiciary all combine to render the TC
structure obtaining in the developing and the transition world, a fertile ground where the
stated pattern of selection (from economic to the political arena) becomes a dominant
process.
It may be noted that North’s characterisation of the institutional requisites of low cost
transacting calls for a large menu. From transparent lawmaking as well as its
enforcement, one may articulate the need for political (and fiscal) decentralisation,
intervention in factor and capital markets to make them perform more efficiently (i.e.,
competitive), and seek means of weakening the rent seeking interest groups. Was one to
embrace these all as equally desirable, both the range of institutions (rules) and of8
governance mechanisms (conduct of the game) widen considerably. By contrast, much of
what goes under the rubric of “governance’ in current economic development parlance is
clearly selective. In principle, the efficacy of the entire set of institutional elements aimed
at lowering the transaction costs would be the conceptual benchmark for "governance".
And it is this totality of institutions (both rules and conduct of the game) that we have
decided to call “institutional capital” (IC) of a society. In sum, these are devices that
allow co-ordination of exchanges, which is of necessity, a resource using process. The
quality of a body of institutions may be gauged both by the relative level of costs, and the
relative range of exchanges that become viable at a point in time (vis-à-vis other
societies). In the next section we would enumerate how precisely one may select and
measure the indicators of institutional capital.
An important question then arises: Does IC have an independent influence on poverty
over and above the effect on growth? Matthews believes it would be hard to do a Denison
type of econometrics and isolate the contribution of institutional capital to growth as
distinct from the standard sources. He does note however that in spite of the inherent
confounding of formal measurement, the qualitative question is more reasonable to pose. 
The Implications for Latin America-Caribbean Region: There is not much in the way of
an LAC literature that focuses on IC as interpreted here. Explaining the output
performance in the region, we note that overall growth was much faster (at 3.4 %) than
the OECD average (about 2.3) over the decade of the 1990s. The sample countries did
fare about the same as the regional average (indeed at per capita growth of 1.83 percent).
One can make a case that after years of military rule in much of the region, the
foundational institutions necessary to sustain the democratic as well a competitive market
mechanism had been struggling to find roots. Economic liberalisation and a move
towards freer trade are fairly new for many. Indeed, a central postulate of the present
paper is that the recent LAC growth process and the attendant poverty outcome have been
fashioned by the policy framework as well as the attendant initial conditions (chiefly, the
quality of institutions, political and social). We elaborate on this theme in the next
section.
(d) NIP and IC: The direct linkage between poverty and IC especially via gains in
income, and directly on the broader dimensions, is intuitive, though possibly poorly
documented. Many believe that the peer-monitoring model of micro lending pioneered in
Bangladesh and replicated pretty much worldwide succeeds due to the social capital (e.g.,
trust within the group, and between the group and the lender) that emerges in an NGO
type of setting. The essential idea is that group lending allows the lenders to overcome
informational asymmetries typical of any credit delivery mechanism. Moral hazard and
adverse selection are the usual impediments to the functioning of the market in such a
context. The principal devices by which the latter are minimised include peer monitoring
and social sanctions within the group (and, possibly within the local community) as
safeguards against excessive risk taking, misuse of funds, and default behaviour. The
above devices work even when the borrower puts up no formal collateral (as in the case
of GB). Such NGO and related voluntary civil society activities, over and above direct
income gains (as the former are typically targeted on the very poor), may also allow
additional benefits in health and education contributing to the alleviation of non-income
poverty. 9
(e) Testable Hypotheses: We first derive a generic poverty function based on the
literature dealing with income poverty as cited above. Our preliminary hypothesis is that
a similar function would also explain non-income poverty as reasoned above. We begin
with the poverty decomposition equation (2.1). Next we suggest that our review of the
modern growth literature as well as NIE focus on institutions allow us to hypothesise
growth behaviour as follows:  
(2.2a) GRO = f(IC, IIQ).
We then invoke the hypothesis explaining the change in inequality, which has an old
Kuznetsian history as well as a modern growth connotation as reviewed above, which
makes us rewrite RIQ as a function of growth:
(2.2b) RIQ = g(GRO).
Combining (2.1) and (2.2a) and (2.2b), we obtain:
(2.3) (∆H/H) =  (-)ε(DEV, IIQ). f(IC, IIQ) + β(DEV, IIQ).RIQ(GRO),
Or, (2.4) (∆H/H) = g(DEV, IIQ, IC, GRO)
Thus once we have utilised the growth-poverty identity implicit in (2.1), we only find
growth as a separate independent variable as associated with the change in inequality,
RIQ. Our empirical specification will often be a linear approximation of (2.4). The
implication however is that it would be hard to interpret the specific coefficients exactly.
For example, the IIQ variable would affect poverty by influencing growth, but initial
inequality also affects the poverty elasticity directly by the decomposition discussed
above. Similarly growth would affect poverty via the standard elasticity (even though we
are not utilising the analytical elasticity à la Bourguignon), but also possibly by changing
the income distribution. 
Bourguignon has criticized the use of a naked “growth”-term as an independent variable
in an equation explaining poverty. He would rather have the theoretical elasticity as a
built-in multiplier in the manner of (2.1). Our defence is essentially that we are not
merely testing for the “identity check” behind (2.1). Our principal hypothesis is embodied
in (2.2). Secondly, even within the decomposition methodology outlined above, it would
be presumptuous to impose a function as the logarithmic on a small sample size as we do
(21 observations at this stage).
The above discussion allows us to lay down the following hypotheses as empirically
plausible. The primary hypothesis is that the headcount poverty function as derived above
(eq 2.4) holds for non-income poverty as well: 
 (2.5a) NIP = ϕ(GRO, IC, DEV, IIQ);
We wish to contrast the above with a simpler alternative, not necessarily based on the
headcount methodology, but one relies directly on the recent literature on growth and
NIE. Put simply this states that initial inequality and poor institutions retard the fight
against NIP, i.e.,
(2.5)  NIP = θ(IC, IIQ);
Below we shall attempt an evaluation of these with the available LAC data.10
3.  Methodology and Data Issues 
(a) Operationalization of Non-Income Poverty: Recall that here we would ideally
measure the output of the economic game that has a bearing on poverty over and above
the income/consumption aspects. In terms of the capability approach, we note that,
deeper aspects of voice and freedom are harder to quantify, but access to inputs and
information would however be consistent with the goal of maximizing the capabilities.
8
Consequently, we focus on (i) female literacy, health status of very young (particularly,
(ii) infant mortality and (iii) birth weight) and (iv) longevity. Literacy and child (or,
maternity) health developments may result from deliberate public policy and formal rules
of society (e.g., compulsory attendance in school to a certain age or widely available rural
health facilities). Or, these may derive from civil and public varieties of social capital
(social support and networking) or a combination of both formal as well as informal
institutions. In any event, it may be noted that the elements cited above indicate the
outcome on the human capital side, and thus the physical capital accomplishment is
slighted in this construction.  While it is not difficult to provide a conceptual measure of
the latter (say the interest rate differential between rural credit and the commercial sector
lending rate), observability is the dominant constraint.   
Table F of the appendix provides a summary of the performance of the sample countries
over the reference period. On female secondary enrolment, we note that there has been
sizeable advance in most cases. Judging by the incidence of low birth weight of babies
(1992-98), we see that the LAC countries boast of a reasonable record of about ten
percent vis-à-vis the South Asian figure of low thirties. The Caribbean countries
generally do poorer than the South American countries as a group. Turning to infant
mortality figures, again there has been a general reduction (of about a quarter over the
decade), and at about 30 per thousand live births, this figure compares well with the
average for the middle-income countries as a whole.  
For our empirical analysis, we have devised a composite index of non-income poverty
(NIP) that effectively accords equal weight to the four components cited here. The first
component is the life expectancy at birth, which averages at 70.7. In keeping with the
principle of equal weights, we actually normalize the remaining components so that the
average in each category is also 70.7. However given that two of these (namely infant
mortality and low birth weight incidence) are “negative variables” in that lowers values
indicate more agreeable outcomes, our NIP aggregate is the sum of {longevity and
female secondary enrolment} less {infant mortality and the incidence of low birth weight
babies}. Hence a higher NIP indicator corresponds to lower poverty! By construction the
average NIP index could be close to zero, and it is indeed so (at - 14.7). The range is {-
132 (Guyana), 91 (Chile)}. Table F displays the aggregate index of NIP. In our
econometric work, we shall attempt to explain the composite indicator, NIP as well as the
four components individually. 
(b) Operationalization of IC: Here we focus on identifying those elements that help lower
transaction costs in exchanges among individuals (or groups, as appropriate). Further we
group the former into three categories, i.e., (i) those lowering the costs of information and
communication, (ii) those supporting market competition, and, finally (iii) those
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strengthening social capital. In doing so, it is imperative to keep in mind that IC is to be
taken as an input that leads to poverty outcomes (both income and non-income), and
hence one must not confound inputs and outputs, a pitfall one may easily lapse into once
confronted with limited data availability.  
We note that many of the features cited above are not available for the LAC countries.
For future reference, we nevertheless enumerate these in the form of a schema (Figure 1)
in the appendix to the paper. Presently, however, we are led to relying on available data,
and in that context, select four out of six indicators proposed by the WBI project on
"Governance" (WB2001c).
9 The six clusters are motivated to capture three aspects of
governance that the authors characterize. First, “voice and accountability” and  “political
stability” are intended to evaluate the process by which those in authority are selected and
replaced (media independence is also included here). The second set, “government
effectiveness” and “regulatory quality” represent the “ability of the government to
formulate and implement sound policies” (p7). The final set, “rule of law” and “control of
corruption” relate to the “respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions” (p6).
10  
For the present, we have chosen (i) control of corruption and the (ii) rule of law as
measuring the quality of formal institutions, while (iii) political stability/lack of violence,
and (iv) voice and accountability proxy for social capital indicators.
11 We devise the
aggregate IC indicator by first assigning a rank (from one to five, the lowest being the
normative best) to the individual country score on each of the four elements cited above.
The accorded ranks follow wide margins that should allow for a fair degree of
measurement errors that may be inherently built in by the manner that these are
constructed in the first place (see Kaufmann and Kraay, 2002). The aggregate is then the
sum of the ordinal rank attached to the individual country score on each of these four
components. We believe that by using ordinals as well as by aggregating the four
indicators together overcomes the difficulty in creating confidence intervals using any
one indicator. Since a lower value is indicative of higher quality institutions, we name the
index, DIC (“decrease in institutional capital”).
The institutional capital variable is thus a composite of four indicators, each of which by
construction ranges from –2.5 (weakest) to +2.5 (best). A score of -1 or less is assigned
the lowest rank of 5, that between -1 and 0 gets 4, between 0 and 0.75 gets 3, between
0.75 and 1.2 gets 2, and all scores above 1.2 get the best score of 1. The summed ordinals
may range from the best possible score of 4 (actual closest being 8 for Chile and Costa
Rica) to 20 for the country with the weakest IC. Indeed the poorest such score is 17,
observed in two cases (Colombia and Guatemala). The construction methodology is
evident from Table G in the appendix. 
                                                
9 Indeed two papers by Kaufmann et al (1999a, b) elaborate on the ideas and methodology behind the
selection.   
10 Note that the sense in which the term “governance” is used in the above construction differs significantly
from the NIE concept reviewed above. Indeed one may argue that the WB term captures aspects of all
forms of institutions, not merely those engaged in a monitoring capacity.   
11 We have left out of consideration the two remaining WBI indicators, namely, (v) regulatory effectiveness
and (vi) government effectiveness for the simple reason that they appear a little too broad in scope.12
It may also be noted that indicators such as the Freedom House index of political and
civil rights (as used by Rodrik and Persson-Tabellini in related work), as well as
Transparency International's corruption index are already incorporated in the construction
of WBI indices, although there may be a lag. Hence there may be a case for using one or
both of these latter indices in their most recent version as an alternative.
(c) Comparable Data Set: The task here is to compile a comparable data set for the 21
sample countries. While the IC and NIP components have been reviewed above, the
remaining data relate to GDP growth, per capita income, trade and (household survey
based) poverty/inequality measures. For GDP growth (i.e., the GRO variable), we use
annualized growth in real GDP between 1990 and 1999. Income (denoted INC) is taken
to measure the level of development (DEV) variable cited in section 2 above. This is
1995 per capita GDP (thousand dollars) in purchasing power parity terms, with the year
being towards the middle of the period under consideration, and accounting for a lag in
its effects. Also note that the initial inequality variable is based on survey data on
income/expenditure as available. Ideally one would want a wealth-based measure, and
the extent to which the income data would have tracked the initial wealth distribution for
the LAC region is unknown. 
The trade to GDP ratio (in PPP terms), denoted TGR, is used as a “globalization”
indicator. All these variables are taken from the World Development Indicators 2001 CD-
ROM. As noted above, the poverty/inequality measure is obtained from the poverty-
monitoring project at the World Bank, which was initially compiled by Chen and
Ravallion (2001) and is accessible to all (WB, 2001a). 
We should point out that unlike the headcount literature that typically uses spell data, all
our NIP data relate to a single point in time (late 1990s, actually 1998 or 1999 according
to availability). Similarly for the IC components. However both growth and inequality are
treated differently. We do test the hypothesis that sustained growth would have an impact
on the alleviation of broader poverty, and thus the GRO variable is the real growth rate
over the decade of the 1990s. In a similar vein, the notion of initial inequality (as of late
1980s, 1988/89 as available) suggests that the former would make a difference to the NIP
outcome either directly or via growth and income. The DEV (or INC) variable is from the
mid-point of the decade of the 1990s, (actually 1995) to allow for a lag as already stated,
while the TGR variable is from late 1990s.  
4. Empirical Evidence
Before focusing on the poverty results, let us briefly outline a few empirical observations
on related issues such as the process of growth, inequality and the evolution of
institutions that this limited data set may permit.  Focussing on annualized GDP growth
rates several observations follow. Over the reference period, 1990-1999, while regional
real annualized output growth has been most respectable (at 3.4 %), the 21 countries in
the sample had also grown perhaps at a slightly faster pace (1.8% in per capita terms).
However, the individual experiences have been very mixed. Per capita Figures range
from negative 0.46% for Venezuela to anaemic rates (say, 0.29% in Nicaragua) to a
stellar performance in Chile (of 5.07%). Generally the Caribbean countries have done
worse as a group vis-à-vis the South American ones within the sample. Indeed
manufacturing and industrial growth had picked up in the decade of the 1990s for the13
region as a whole, while agriculture had progressed a bit slower (2.3 %, which is the
same rate as of the 1980s). The service sector also grew at 3.5 % in the reference period,
which is about half that in East or South Asia.  
A.  Aggregate NIP: Analysing the composite measure, we see that generally neither
GDP growth (GRO) nor the initial inequality (i.e., IIQ) is successful in the explanation
(see equations 1 and 1A in Table A.1). There is also the issue whether the distribution
corrected growth (e.g. as measured by the interaction variable, GRO.IIQ) would do any
better, a point that that has been highlighted in the income poverty estimation by
Ravallion (2001). Modifying equation (1) whereby the variables {GRO, IIQ} are
replaced by the interaction term does not provide much of a lead (and not reported in the
Table). It is interesting to note that neither of these variables is much correlated with
income. Both equations (4) and (5) show that while initial inequality appears not to affect
NIP performance of nations, growth (either directly or in the interaction mode) appears to
be a significant variable, but appearing with a wrong sign, thus hurting the advances
against NIP. We shall argue however that this inference is not very reliable. In both these
equations, we also have the institutional capital variable, which is somewhat correlated
with both the growth variables (the coefficient being 0.54 for GRO and 0.53 for
GRO.IIQ). The political stability measure (PLS) is not so correlated (in the range of 0.32
to 0.35), and indeed equations (4A) and (5A) illustrate that once DIC is replaced by PLS,
the growth variables become insignificant (though the negative sign persists). A
comparison of eqs (4A) and (5A) also confirms that between {GRO, IIQ} and
(GRO.IIQ), there is not much of a choice. 
The level of development, as measured by the level of income (INC) is of significance,
however. Interestingly, replacing INC by its logarithm (LIN) in equation (1) leads to an
improvement (as given by equation 1A) as also captured by a slightly modified
specification given in equation (2). Hence the impact of income would appear to be non-
linear. Thus in terms of variables conventionally used in the income poverty estimations,
namely GRO, IIQ, LIN/INC provides a moderate fit. However, of these only income
(either LIN or INC) provides a robust t-statistic. Replacing GRO by GRO.IIQ in eq (1A)
does not alter results (in terms of adjusted R-sq, 0.42 in each case, and an F-value of 7,
and hence not reported). However the latter specification would be comparable to
equation (3) in Bourguignon’s Table 1 (“the improved standard model”). 
The estimated results get much sharper once the IC variables come in. Indeed the
institutional capital variables turn out to be key explanators of the evolution of non-
income poverty in the LAC region. Both in the aggregate as well as in components (PLS
or COC), IC variables are powerful explanators. PLS in isolation does best, explaining
54% of the variation in NIP.
12 However both DIC and COC are each correlated with LIN,
the coefficients being (-) 0.58 and 0.67, respectively, while the coefficient between LIN
and PLS is merely 0.45. Correspondingly, while eq (4) appears to provide a very good fit
to the data, replacing DIC by PLS (as in 4A) improves matters a lot. We have already
commented on the possible correlation between GRO.IIQ and DIC. Hence there is a very
strong reason for preferring the (4A) specification. Note the very high (heteroskedasticity
                                                
12 While the aggregate IC variable (DIC) is calibrated such that it rises the poorer the quality of institutions,
in the case of the components these are measured by their raw score, and higher values indicate an
improvement in quality. Hence the sign of the coefficients differ between DIC and its components. 14
corrected) F-value for (4A), 43.9 vis-à-vis 17.2 for (4). Correspondingly, the adjusted R-
sq rises from 0.68 to 0.75. Equation (5a) provides an equally god fit, where the F-value is
even higher (at 47.2). It is interesting to note that political stability (PLS) turns out to be
the single most important component of DIC in this context, which indeed is one of the
areas in which the region is apparently well positioned compared to the rest of the world
(Kaufmann-Kraay, 2002).
The relevance of institutional capital is quite evident; elements such as effective control
of corruption, rule of law or public accountability do make for greater access to public
resources (be in health, education or infrastructure) to all citizens. Lower initial inequality
would in principle also play a similar role; it serves to complement the public resources
that are available. Correspondingly, where pubic facilities are highly inadequate, personal
wealth becomes indispensable thus causing great disparities in access to physical and
human capital. However in the LAC context it is intriguing to find its conspicuous
absence, and this in a region where the level of inequality is much higher than in many
regions.
Given the central role in the estimation results, it would be useful to examine the DIC
variable more closely. Presently the manner in which DIC is constructed all four
components appear to be mutually correlated which may not allow reliable joint
coefficient estimates for strict subsets of these components.
13 Perhaps one may look for
alternative indicators, which do not involve such a high correlation with each other (and,
vis-à-vis other explanatory variables) and thus allow independent coefficient estimates.
From a policy perspective, this would appear to be an urgent research agenda. 
The globalization/integration variable (TGR) too appears with a wrong sign in Table A.1.
However, unlike growth, here the correlation between TGR and other independent
variables are weaker, though at 0.5 for DIC, this is a potential source of worry. However
between PLS and TGR the coefficient is a mere 0.31. Indeed like the growth variables,
when we replace DIC by PLS, the TGR regression coefficient loses in value, but unlike
growth, the estimate remains significant. The coefficient is rather stable in all proper
specification (e.g., 4A or 5A). Greater trade success therefore appears to hurt the poverty
reduction on the non-income front. The quantitative effect is small however; even a large
change (say equalling its standard deviation) of 14.5 points in openness would imply a
drop in the NIP index of a similar range, namely 15 points. The DIC or PLS variables by
comparison have rather large positive effects. One standard deviation improvement in
PLS (which is 0.67) would translate to a change of about 39 points in NIP for the better
based on equations 4A or 5A. Interestingly, Rodrik also finds that “once institutions are
controlled for, economic integration has no direct effects on incomes..” (2002, p4). He
further found that IC has significant effect on institutions, and vice-versa (i.e. bi-
directional causality), both are strongly significant (5% level). Consequently, integration
has an indirect (positive) effect on incomes by improving IC. However, the direct effect,
                                                
13 Only voice and accountability (VOA) was found to be not significant in any equation.15
while insignificant came out negative. The negative coefficient also appears in another
recent paper by Dollar-Kraay (2002).
14  
Thus while income does matter robustly, growth itself is at best irrelevant to NIP
outcomes. This is intriguing. We note that the correlation between income levels and
growth is a mere 0.11, and hence faster growth need not lead to large changes in per
capita incomes. While we did not estimate income growth equations, the latter story
would be consistent with the hypothesis that high initial inequality does not allow growth
to translate to commensurate rises in per capita incomes. Another perspective may be that
growth matters only in so far as it augments the quality of IC. If better quality institutions
lead to faster growth but growth does not lead to better quality institutions, as Kaufmann
and Kraay (2002) find, the above hypothesis would be substantiated. A lot therefore
remains to be done. 
Thus on the basis of these results, it seems that both eqs (4A) and (5A) provide excellent
fits, each explaining about three-fourths of the variation in the dependent variable. A
quantitative interpretation of the estimated equation would proceed as follows. The effect
of a change in these explanatory variables can only be interpreted to cause an effect on
the NIP index as constructed by us. Using equation (5A) as a benchmark, the difference
between the predicted values of NIP between Argentina and Peru should be 90.35. The
actual difference in the sample is 73.015, with Peru scoring (-12.74), better than its
predicted value of minus 33.5 and Argentina scoring 60.33, its predicted value being
56.84.
In sum therefore, we observe that non-income poverty got worse with the decline in the
institutional capital and particularly with the decline in political stability. This
conclusion is similar to a related finding for the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union
(EEFSU) as described in Ahsan (2002a), but there COC played a central role,
overshadowing political stability issues. We do not know of other studies that corroborate
this sort of evidence, one way or another.
B.  Explaining Life Expectancy (LEB):  Life expectancy varies in a relatively
narrow range from 62.1 (Bolivia) to 76.8 (Costa Rica), the average being 70.7.
Reviewing the results in Table B, we note that the traditional income poverty inspired
hypotheses do not perform well as exhibited by equation (1) or (2). Neither the {GRO,
IIQ}-pair nor the interactive GRO.IIQ term is significant. Income however is strongly
significant, and it alone explains all the variability in longevity in equations (1) and (2).
Indeed, the logarithm of income appears to be even better in explaining longevity, a point
that has been recognised in the development economics literature for a very long time
(e.g., Preston, 1975). Indeed, LIN alone explains 37% (i.e., using the adjusted R-squared
value) of the variability in longevity differences in the LAC region (equation 3A in Table
B).
15 Interestingly, as seen by comparing equation (2) and (3A) that the adjusted R-sq
                                                
14  Dollar-Kraay (2002) explain income growth by using a measure of “real openness” where the
denominator is GDP in PPP terms, but they too come up with the negative sign. Rodrik et al point out that
the biases in the real openness measure are worse than for the nominal trade/GDP ratio, TGR).
15 Elsewhere Ahsan (2002b) has examined both cross country as well as time series data (the latter for
Indonesia), and found that the logarithmic specification fitted the data rather well (even when compared to
the quadratic function).16
actually falls when we add {GRO.IIQ} to LIN. In a similar vein, the level of initial
inequality appears not to affect the longevity differences among nations. 
The institutional variable DIC is again the factor of significance here (compare eqs 3B
and 4). Taken by itself it is just as powerful a predictor as LIN. However as noted above,
DIC and LIN are mutually correlated which calls into question the reliability of equation
(4). It is therefore necessary to disentangle the DIC into its components. Here PLS has
the lowest correlation. Looked at this way, equation (4A) perhaps provides the most
reliable of estimates in Table B. We note that LIN particularly has a very stable
coefficient in all equations; while it is 4.9 (when entered alone), it evidently falls once IC
variables come in, but remains steady at about 3.2 or so.   
In terms of the remaining components of the IC variable, notwithstanding the
multicollinearity potential, corruption (COC) also does well (eq 4B). However, the
adjusted R-sq value is the weakest for COC of the three here (i.e., among 4, 4A, and 4B).
While overall, PLS performs the best, the quantitative significance is far short of its
impact on the aggregate NIP (even allowing for the fact that NIP range was about three
times as large as for life expectancy). Using equation 4A (LIN and PLS) to explain
longevity, we note the predicted difference between Uruguay and Bolivia comes to 8.74
years (Bolivia 65.97 and Uruguay 74.71) whereas it is actually 12.2 years (Bolivia 62.06
and Uruguay 74.3).
The rationale for the role of PLS in influencing the average longevity is intuitive in that
violence and instability takes many unnecessary lives around the world. Many Latin
American countries have witnessed both death and debilitation due to political instability
over the past two decades. 
C. Explaining Infant Mortality (IFM): Table F indicates that average mortality for the
sample is 28.3, which is a bit smaller than the regional average as a whole. The lowest
(about 10) obtains for Chile while the highest rate is found in Bolivia (about 59). The
range is rather large, and correspondingly, infant mortality behaviour happens to have a
pretty high variance in the LAC region (standard deviation being 13.4). In terms of the
correlation matrix, we see that the incidence of infant mortality correlates well with all
income and IC variables.
Here the standard specification does rather well to begin with (see eqs 1 and 2), even
though the coefficient on either GRO or the interactive GRO.IIQ term is not statistically
significant. Only the income variable (where again the logarithm performs better than the
level) is highly significant. What is puzzling, as in the aggregate NIP estimation, is that
growth appears to have the wrong sign, namely that higher growth apparently leads to
rising mortality. Indeed the coefficient of GRO (or GRO.IIQ) is quite significant
whenever the institutional variable is also added in (see eqs. 3 and 4). Focussing on eq
(4), which has the highest adjusted R-squared value (of 0.58), the growth effect is
perverse and strongly significant (at the one percent level)! We also note that all the
exogenous variables save TGR in eq (4), namely GRO, LIN and DIC, are somewhat
correlated. While there is no evidence of serious multi-collinearity, replacing DIC by PLS
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removes any doubt that one may have in this regard. This leads to equation (4A), which
again comes up with a high t-value for the growth variable. 
The globalization indicator, TGR, again appears with the wrong anticipated sign, but here
at least the coefficients are not statistically significant (unlike the NIP case). While its
inclusion appears to improve the overall predictability of the model (compare eqs 4 and
5)! However, by the same token, the above inference is not substantiated once PLS
replaces DIC (see 4A and 5A). If anything, (5A) would appear to be a clear improvement
over (5). While the last four equations in Table C provide a reasonable explanation of
data, we prefer the specification in (4A) and (5A). Based on these last two equations, one
may draw several inferences. First we note that quantitative significance of the growth
variable is cut by about half (the coefficient dropping from 4.1 in eq (4) to a little over 2
in eqs (4A) or (5A). More importantly the statistical confidence in the precision of this
estimate is open to question. Hence one does not really have to dwell on the sign issue
cited above.   
LIN has the predicted sign and its quantitative impact remains most stable in all
specifications, settling down to a value of about -16 in the latter two equations in focus
here. A unit change in the LIN variable (which around its mean would imply moving
form a per capita income of  $3,000 to $8,000 in PPP terms, a huge change indeed) would
lower mortality by 16 points, e.g. from 20 to 36 (again taking values around the mean).
An example would be Ecuador and Uruguay, since in the former the per capita income is
$3,200 and mortality rate is 28.4 (sample average being 28.3) while in the latter case, we
have an income of $ 8,000 and a mortality rate of 14.5 per thousand. It is intuitive that
income would be expected to serve as a good proxy for both the knowledge of the
precaution and care as well as the delivery of the same. 
The institutional variable also augments the access to public facilities in the absence of
corruption and disorder. In terms of the overall fit, using equation 5A coefficients to
predict infant mortality gives predicted values of 40.25 and 25.79 per thousand live births
respectively for Guatemala and Jamaica, whereas the actual numbers are 40.2 and 20.4.
D.  Explaining Low Birth Weights (LBW): Traditional income/expenditure poverty
type of analysis that use variables such as income, GRO or GRO.IIQ does not appear to
be especially helpful in explaining the incidence of low birth-weight (LBW) babies.
While not significant, both growth and income come out with the correct sign. On the
level of development, neither INC nor its logarithm matters much, though INC, unlike the
previous cases actually does a bit better than LIN. Further the income term loses
whatever predictive power it had (eqs 1 and 2) once institutional variables are allowed in
(as in 4). 
Of equations (4) - (6), we prefer (5) as providing the best results. Both the adjusted R-sq
as well as the F-value are much higher in (5) than in (4). Similarly comparing (4) and (6)
we see that including TGR adds both to the adjusted R-sq and the F-statistic. Thus the
specifications (5) and (6) are more reliable than in (4), though adjusted R-sq are still low
vis-à-vis previous cases. While according to (4), initial inequality appears to have a
strong negative influence (significant at the 5% level) on the incidence of low birth-
weight babies, the effect gets diluted in equation (6), but remains statistically significant
at the 10% level. Is it plausible that more unequal LAC societies deliver better pre-natal18
nutrition and care! This is surely intriguing. We do note however that quantitatively the
size of the coefficient need not be viewed as small.  One standard deviation increase in
IIQ (equalling 7.18 percentage points) translates to a decrease of 1.1 percentage points in
LBW (i.e., almost ten percent change in the mean incidence, mean being10.18)! 
The globalization variable too has a dubious effect, which is statistically significant
(compare equations 4 and 6). Taken at face value, this says that higher trade leads to
poorer health outcomes as measured by the birth weight of newborns. The latter is most
counterintuitive! One observation is that once TGR is there, inequality loses some of its
explanatory power, but both variables still remain significant at the 10% level. 
From here on we choose eq (5) over (6) to further explore the role of individual IC
components. Thus eq (5A), with PLS replacing DIC, does clearly improve upon eq (5)
following usual diagnostics. Conversely, using COC instead of DIC, i.e., moving from
(5) to (5B), weakens the estimation, although corruption itself remain just as significant
as was the case with DIC in (5). Thus all considered eq (5A) would appear to the best-
fitted equation in Table D. Here both political stability and the globalization variable
come out strongly (and the latter with the wrong expected sign). The quantitative
significance of the integration variable is not small either. One standard deviation
increase in TGR (i.e., of 14.5 percentage points), which is rather high, would lead to a
decrease of 1.16 percentage points in the mean incidence of LBW (at 10.1).
On the role of political stability and lack of violence, one can easily imagine that only
under such institutional context expectant mothers may gain access to public facilities
and counselling on pre-natal health and nutrition. On the overall fit of LBW equations,
using the coefficient estimates of 5A leads us to predict a difference of 4.5 points
between Chile and Venezuela, whereas the actual difference is 7 points.
E.  Explaining Female Secondary Enrolment: 
Table E indicates that that the model analyzed here does not appear to explain female
secondary school enrolment behaviour adequately. Two brief observations are in order.
First the income variable (indeed the level rather than the logarithm) is the only robust
explanator of enrolment in the LAC region. Of all the NIP components analysed in the
paper, this is the only case where the IC variables seem quite inept in describing the
variations in educational attainment. While the adjusted R-sq of 0.26 is the highest in eq
(3A), which has income and the rule of law as the rhs variables, the latter is not
statistically significant. In terms of the predictive ability of this equation, we note that the
estimated coefficients lead us to expect a difference of 33.88 percentage points between
say Argentina and Nicaragua, while the actual difference is 31.51 (with Argentina at 96.9
and Nicaragua at 65.39).  
F. A Brief Summary of the Empirical Evidence
Growth: In comparing our NIP results to the standard headcount income poverty studies
cited above, we do not find a robust role for growth (either by itself or in the interactive
fashion with initial inequality). Between the two forms of the growth variable, there is not
really much of a choice. However, the trouble here is that each of these terms appears
with a wrong expected sign, sometimes quite significantly, and especially so once we
have controlled for the institutional capital variables. This is true of several specifications19
devoted to the explanation of the aggregate NIP as well as infant mortality. This is
troublesome, and requires further scrutiny. Incidentally, for the birth-weight equations,
where growth does have the correct anticipated sign, the coefficient is not statistically
significant.     
Inequality: Initial inequality does not have much of a role, except in explaining the
incidence of low birth-weight babies. Awkwardly, here the sign is opposite of what one
would expect. Indeed the sign is mostly wrong in other cases as well, but typically these
were not statistically significant. This part of the result is most unexpected especially
given the contrary evidence obtained from a similar analysis of NIP for the EEFSU
countries (Ahsan, 2002a), and calls for further examination.   
Level of Development: In most cases the logarithm of income does much better than
income itself, (except however for the low birth-weight and female enrolment equations).
It is most significant in explaining the aggregate NIP, expected longevity as well as infant
mortality. The level variable is highly significant in explaining the school enrolment, but
not so for the low-birth weight equations. Thus, insofar as the latter indicators of well-
being are thought to matter to the poor, an income-based measure would fail to capture
these dimensions adequately. Measuring the broader poverty elasticity of income, we find
these to be all below unity. The higher impact does occur for the aggregate e indicator.
We note that a unit change in LIN (which, evaluated around the mean corresponds to a
change in per capita income of about 3,000 to 7,700 in PPP terms), result in a 62-point
surge in the NIP indicator.
16 This would correspond to an elasticity of about 0.66 using
the arc measure. All other elasticities are even smaller. For example, infant mortality also
appears to respond in a large way to income changes, but even then here the elasticity (at
the mean) comes to about 0.36. The preceding remarks also strengthen the belief that if
broader poverty is the criterion of well-being, income gains need not even be a good
approximation.     
Institutional Capital: Overall we find that the aggregate indicator, DIC, performs very
well in all cases, where it is often the most significant variable capable of explaining a
fair bit of the overall variability in the dependent variable. Indeed practically all
components of the institutional capital variable (possibly with exception of voice and
accountability) each have an important role to play, though political stability was by far
the more significant of the set.  We note that political and economic reforms, both
domestic (since the overthrow of several military dictatorships in the region) as well as
donor driven, have led to wide differences in the evolution of institutions as construed in
this paper. Examining the impact of a unit change in PLS on NIP, the coefficient from
eqs 4A/5A of 57.5 amount to a 49 % change at the mean, while the unit change in the
PLS indicator may be interpreted to yield a change of 65% (on the arc measure). Hence
the elasticity is 0.76. The elasticity is slightly lower for the low birth-weight incidence
(0.54) and the infant mortality behaviour (0.44). Clearly elasticities are higher than those
for the income variable discussed above. In the birth-weight equation, income was not
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4A/5A (NIP), 4A (longevity), 4A/ 5A (infant mortality), 5A (birth-weight) and 2/3A (school enrolment),
respectively. For the NIP indicator we are saying that the income change cited here is 80 percent  (using the
arc concept), while at the mean, the implied change in NIP (on normalized positive scale) is about 54%,
and hence the implied elasticity would be about 0.66.20
even a significant force. There is thus a quantitative indication that institutional variables
dominate the income variable in terms of impact on broader poverty.
5. Conclusion
This paper set several primary goals. One was to review the LAC broader poverty
experience (1989-99/00) for a sample of 21 countries, and attempt to discern the scope of
the quality of institutions in affecting poverty. This was to be carried out in terms of the
stylised hypotheses of growth-poverty-inequality nexus depicted above (section 2), where
we had built in an emphasis on institutional capital. Our key findings, interim as these
are, have been restated in the preceding section. In a word, the institutional capital
variable appears to have a most emphatic role in explaining non-income poverty
reduction. However, logarithm of income also appears to be robust in several cases.
Indeed, IC variables for the most part overshadow other plausible phenomena, including
the role of income. Consequently, we conclude that a deeper investigation into additional
variables (beyond the four included in the present construction) in a richer data set (i.e.,
possibly for a larger set of countries) would be extremely useful from a policy
perspective.
How do the above findings relate to existing results in the literature? The literature
provides little direct evidence on broader measures of IC, especially as they relate to the
issues of poverty and inequality. Closest perhaps to our interests is a paper on Rodrik et
al (2002) who analyses income growth of nations and find that institutions (measured by
the rule of law) play a crucial role in this explanation. Indeed they find that once IC is
controlled for, elements such as economic integration (our TGR variable) or geographical
indicators have little to add. The IC variable has been extensively analysed by other
authors (cited by Rodrik, et al, 2002), but the latter is the only attempt where geography,
globalization as well as IC were all included in one coherent analysis. There is also the
finding by Dollar and Kraay (2001a) that rule of law has a positive impact on growth.
Our approach has been at a more disaggregate level, whereby we experiment with several
indicators of IC and find the political stability variable to yield more precise estimators.
Somewhat afield, Persson and Tabellini (2001) examined the effects of the democracy
type on the fiscal outcome (e.g., size of the public sector and the nature of fiscal
interventions). Earlier Rodrik (2001) found that the extent of political participation (as
measured by political rights and civil liberties) does make for a more stable pattern (i.e.,
reduced volatility) of output growth. In terms of non-income poverty, ours appears to be
the first effort to explain this behaviour empirically.  
How to build better institutions? We have identified the central role of the political
stability as perhaps the foremost indicator of IC for the LAC region, possibly followed by
the control of corruption. This is the reverse of the order of evidence for EEFSU cited
above. Given our views of the institutional forces, such goals are not achievable unless
countries strive for participatory rich democracies (with adequate political and fiscal
decentralisation) and adopt institutions compatible with competitive markets (in goods
and production resources). However the institutional story is still incomplete. The social
capital idea tells us that cohesion and networking within communities may be fruitfully
harnessed through NGO and civil society intermediation. Public authorities must
therefore encourage free and unhindered initiatives by such organisations, which often
appear efficient in the low cost provision of goods and services that private markets alone21
are unable to fully allocate. Indeed the authorities may go farther, and legislate provisions
to strengthen the organisational foundations of NGOs by legitimizing their intermediation
status, and requiring them to follow adequate accounting principles (via credible audit
regimes).  
Policy interventions such as the promotion of self-employment (say via group-based
micro lending), which over and above direct income generation (and thus help fight
income poverty), are widely believed to permit group members more effective utilisation
of social capital. The latter externality is believed to lead to advances in non-income
dimensions of poverty (e.g., health, sanitation, literacy and numeracy).
17 Of course,
deliberate NGO-civil society initiatives in these areas, with or without the contrivance of
micro credit, may also speed up these goals by allowing an easier access to the rural
people, and thus partly offset historical differences in initial conditions.
                                                
17 See Morduch for a critical review of the arguments.22
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APPENDIX
Table A. Explaining non-income poverty
Independent Variable 1 1A 2 3 4 4A 5 5A 6 6A
Constant -178.60 ** -760.33 *** -696.49 *** -23.36 ** -107.72 -505.59 *** -120.64 -520.82 *** -464.04 *** -495.15 ***
Std. error 80.19 173.64 161.72 8.66 171.13 88.48 159.63 101.96 121.99 105.05
t-stat -2.23 -4.38 -4.31 -2.70 -0.63 -5.71 -0.76 -5.11 -3.80 -4.71
GRO 3.23 0.51 -16.94 *** -6.97
Std. error 7.02 6.78 4.77 4.43
t-stat 0.46 0.07 -3.55 -1.57
IIQ 1.72 1.10 1.56 0.27
Std. error 1.39 1.23 1.02 0.76




GRO*IIQ -0.32 ** -0.13
Std. error 0.13 0.11
t-stat -2.55 -1.26
LIN 81.01 *** 79.97 *** 52.12 *** 61.44 *** 47.23 ** 61.59 *** 51.96 *** 58.17 ***
Std. error 18.03 18.79 16.63 10.38 17.29 10.01 14.28 12.34
t-stat 4.49 4.26 3.13 5.92 2.73 6.15 3.64 4.71
DIC -19.93 *** -21.76 ***
Std. error 3.66 3.11
t-stat -5.45 -7.01
TGR -2.12 *** -1.10 ** -1.93 *** -1.04 ** -0.86 **
Std. error 0.60 0.38 0.54 0.38 0.38
t-stat -3.51 -2.87 -3.56 -2.74 -2.23
PLS 65.23 *** 57.67 *** 57.27 *** 47.57 *** 51.28 ***
Std. error 14.56 8.35 7.75 10.72 9.96
t-stat 4.48 6.91 7.39 4.44 5.15
Number of Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Degrees of freedom 17 17 19 19 16 16 15 15 18 17
R-squared 0.4669 0.5068 0.4889 0.5634 0.7415 0.7957 0.8049 0.8057 0.7286 0.7672
Adjusted R-squared 0.3729 0.4197 0.4620 0.5405 0.6769 0.7446 0.7400 0.7409 0.6984 0.7261
F-Statistic 5.0867 7.2225 18.1144 20.0757 17.1741 43.8983 33.7201 47.1490 31.8337 48.2129
p-value of F-statistic 0.0107604 0.0024728 0.000427 0.0002562 1.215E-05 1.971E-08 1.207E-07 1.202E-08 1.227E-06 1.586E-08
Note: Standard errors and F-statistics are heteroskedasticity corrected
*** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 1% level of significance
** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 5% level of significance
* t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 10% level of significance26
B. Explaining Life Expectancy
Independent Variable 1 2 3A 3B 4 4A 4B
Constant 65.33 *** 28.66 ** 28.92 ** 83.01 *** 50.39 *** 41.99 *** 44.33 ***
Std. error 7.52 11.75 11.42 2.05 16.91 9.68 13.62













LIN 4.95 *** 4.90 *** 3.25 * 3.33 *** 3.13 *
Std. error 1.39 1.32 1.69 1.14 1.57
t-stat 3.57 3.72 1.93 2.92 2.00
DIC -0.92 *** -0.55 **








Number of Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Degrees of Freedom 17 18 19 19 18 18 18
R-squared 0.2947 0.4024 0.4018 0.3744 0.4917 0.5676 0.4659
Adjusted R-squared 0.1702 0.3360 0.3703 0.3414 0.4352 0.5195 0.4066
F-Statistic 2.7528 6.8227 13.8140 28.7553 14.3681 13.1368 11.8158
p-value of F-statistic 0.07456176 0.006232 0.00146289 3.5616E-05 0.00018645 0.00030349 0.00052801
Note: Standard errors and F-statistics are heteroskedasticity corrected
*** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 1% level of significance
** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 5% level of significance
* t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 10% level of significance27
C. Explaining Infant Mortality
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4 4A 5 5A
Constant 200.17 *** 201.77 *** 97.04 * 88.48 * 161.02 *** 114.94 ** 157.35 ***
Std. error 46.90 48.06 50.93 47.92 31.92 45.02 35.97
t-stat 4.27 4.20 1.91 1.85 5.04 2.55 4.38
GRO 1.34 4.08 *** 2.33 * 2.78 * 2.10
Std. error 1.41 1.36 1.20 1.58 1.27
t-stat 0.95 2.99 1.95 1.76 1.65
IIQ -0.15 -0.19





GRO*IIQ 0.02 0.07 **
Std. error 0.03 0.03
t-stat 0.74 2.21
LIN -19.58 *** -19.46 *** -14.40 *** -14.05 *** -16.24 *** -14.07 ** -15.47 ***
Std. error 4.65 4.58 4.91 4.67 3.96 5.13 4.42
t-stat -4.21 -4.24 -2.93 -3.01 -4.10 -2.74 -3.50
DIC 3.05 *** 3.33 *** 2.10 **
Std. error 1.02 0.92 0.83
t-stat 3.00 3.62 2.54
TGR 0.26 0.28 0.10
Std. error 0.20 0.20 0.17




PLS -8.14 ** -7.55 **








Number of Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Degrees of Freedom 17 17 16 16 16 17 17
R-squared 0.5336 0.5221 0.6190 0.6614 0.6431 0.6111 0.6342
Adjusted R-squared 0.4513 0.4378 0.5238 0.5768 0.5539 0.5424 0.5696
F-Statistic 6.4578 6.8715 8.9531 10.9179 7.2958 5.8622 7.3883
p-value of F-statistic 0.0040724 0.0030983 0.00054 0.0001832 0.0015249 0.0061311 0.0022275
Note: Standard errors and F-statistics are heteroskedasticity corrected
*** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 1% level of significance
** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 5% level of significance
* t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 10% level of significance28
D. Explaining Low Birthweight Babies
Independent Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 5A 5B
Constant 19.54 *** 12.42 *** 2.94 9.93 * -3.02 4.85 8.63 *** 7.70 ***
Std. error 4.88 1.54 3.04 5.57 2.92 5.51 1.14 1.42




IIQ -0.14 -0.18 ** -0.15 *
Std. error 0.08 0.08 0.08
t-stat -1.73 -2.27 -1.81
INC -0.29 -0.23 -0.01 -0.09
Std. error 0.17 0.16 0.23 0.23







DIC 0.53 ** 0.69 ** 0.79 *** 0.82 ***
Std. error 0.25 0.28 0.23 0.26
t-stat 2.17 2.43 3.46 3.20
TGR 0.09 ** 0.08 * 0.07 ** 0.08 *
Std. error 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04













Number of Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
Degrees of Freedom 17 18 19 17 18 16 18 18
R-squared 0.1758 0.1257 0.1579 0.2826 0.2716 0.3523 0.4189 0.2415
Adjusted R-squared 0.0303 0.0285 0.1136 0.1560 0.1907 0.1904 0.3544 0.1572
F-Statistic 2.0131 2.1521 4.7217 3.6005 8.4487 7.4220 9.4528 6.6729
p-value of F-statistic 0.150205 0.145207 0.042639 0.035239 0.002584 0.001402 0.001562 0.00679
Note: Standard errors and F-statistics are heteroskedasticity corrected
*** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 1% level of significance
** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 5% level of significance
* t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 10% level of significance29
E. Explaining Gross Female Secondary School Enrollment
Independent Variable 1 2 3 3A
Constant 73.38 ** 51.01 *** 107.55 *** 60.81 ***
Std. error 34.09 8.66 26.83 7.89




INC 4.36 *** 4.26 *** 2.79 **
Std. error 1.23 1.31 1.19







Number of Observations 19 19 19 19
Degrees of Freedom 16 17 17 16
R-squared 0.3082 0.2769 0.1217 0.3393
Adjusted R-squared 0.2217 0.2343 0.0700 0.2568
F-Statistic 6.3607 10.6378 1.6255 6.3681
p-value of F-statistic 0.009275 0.004596 0.219475 0.009237
Note: Standard errors and F-statistics are heteroskedasticity corrected
** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 5% level
* t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 10% level
*** t-statistic leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis (coefficient=0) at the 1% level of 






secondary, female (% 
gross) 
Mortality rate, 
infant (per 1,000 
live births) 
Low-birthweight 




A+B-C-D     (weight 
adjusted)
Argentina 73.57 96.90 18.40 7.00 60.33
Bahamas, The 73.00 76.52 17.56 9.40 25.70
Bolivia 62.06 75.73 58.80 9.00 -101.34
Brazil 67.15 108.66 32.20 8.00 18.04
Chile 75.51 85.99 9.98 5.00 90.79
Colombia 70.35 74.65 22.76 17.00 -48.85
Costa Rica 76.84 53.94 12.38 6.00 48.07
Dominican Republic 70.69 73.31 39.00 14.00 -74.53
Ecuador 69.23 57.12 28.40 17.00 -82.50
El Salvador 69.53 49.63 30.08 11.00 -50.39
Guatemala 64.89 30.36 40.20 7.60 -77.32
Guyana 63.70 81.71 56.80 15.00 -132.00
Honduras 69.82 76.52 34.40 9.00 -22.86
Jamaica 75.16 82.01 20.40 11.00 13.21
Mexico 72.14 74.85 29.40 9.20 -9.22
Nicaragua 68.63 65.39 34.32 8.00 -26.94
Panama 73.88 70.99 20.28 9.00 16.54
Peru 68.74 78.35 39.20 5.80 -12.74
Trinidad and Tobago 72.63 81.91 15.72 14.00 2.20
Uruguay 74.30 98.96 14.50 8.00 66.90
Venezuela, RB 73.16 64.63 20.20 12.00 -11.70
Average 70.71 74.20 28.33 10.10 -14.70
Weight equalizer 1.00 0.93 2.87 7.271
Country Voice and Accountability Political Stability Rule of Law Control of Corruption Sum of the ordinals
Argentina 0.57 (3) 0.55 (3) 0.22 (3)  -0.36 (4) 13
Bahamas, The 1.15 (2) 0.68 (3) 0.85 (2) 0.74 (3) 10
Bolivia 0.27 (3)  -0.67 (4)  -0.41 (4)  -0.72 (4) 15
Brazil 0.53 (3) 0.47 (3)  -0.26 (4)  -0.02 (4) 14
Chile 0.63 (3) 0.87 (2) 1.19 (2) 1.40 (1) 8
Colombia  -0.41 (4)  -1.36 (5)  -0.77 (4)  -0.39 (4) 17
Costa Rica 1.37 (1) 1.08 (2) 0.61 (3) 0.87 (2) 8
Dominican Republic 0.42 (3) 0.46 (3) 0.01 (3)  -0.20 (4) 13
Ecuador  -0.14 (4)  -0.80 (4)  -0.76 (4)  -0.98 (4) 16
El Salvador 0.21 (3) 0.62 (3)  -0.65 (4)  -0.33 (4) 14
Guatemala  -0.33 (4)  -0.77 (4)  -1.00 (5)  -0.69 (4) 17
Guyana 0.94 (2)  -0.70 (4) 0.13 (3)  -0.45 (4) 13
Honduras  -0.04 (4) 0.25 (3)  -1.06 (5)  -0.63 (4) 16
Jamaica 0.78 (2) 0.35 (3)  -0.38 (4)  -0.06 (4) 13
Mexico 0.12 (3) 0.06 (3)  -0.41 (4)  -0.28 (4) 14
Nicaragua  -0.06 (4) 0.31 (3)  -0.79 (4)  -0.80 (4) 15
Panama 0.77 (2) 0.57 (3)  -0.12 (4)  -0.45 (4) 13
Peru 0.15 (3)  -0.23 (4)  -0.53 (4)  -0.04 (4) 15
Trinidad and Tobago 0.61 (3) 0.27 (3) 0.41 (3) 0.49 (3) 12
Uruguay 1.08 (2) 1.05 (2) 0.63 (3) 0.71 (3) 10
Venezuela, RB  -0.34 (4)  -0.33 (4)  -0.81 (4)  -0.59 (4) 16
Average 0.39 0.13 -0.18 -0.13
Notes:
1. Source: World Bank  - Governance Matters II: Updated Indicators for 2000-01
2. The scores are in a range of about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes
3. The figures in brackets are ordinal ranks given based on the following scheme:  A score of or below -1 is assigned the lowest rank of 5, that 
between -1 and 0 gets 4, between 0 and 0.75 gets 3, between 0.75 and 1.2 gets 2, and all scores above 1.2 get the best score of 1.
4. The sum of ordinals reflects the sum of the ranks assigned in each of the four coulmns, with a higher absolute number reflecting a poorer 
governance outcome
Table G: Institutional Capital Indicators (DIC)2
Table H: Correlation Chart
NIP LONG INFM FSCH LWGHT GRO IIQ INC GRO*IIQ LIN DIC TGR VOA PLS ROL COC
NIP 1.00
LONG 0.82 1.00
INFM -0.84 -0.92 1.00
FSCH 0.46 0.18 -0.16 1.00
LWGHT -0.61 -0.21 0.18 -0.13 1.00
GRO 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.23 -0.25 1.00
IIQ 0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.14 -0.21 -0.11 1.00
INC 0.65 0.54 -0.62 0.53 -0.22 0.11 -0.19 1.00
GRO*IIQ 0.20 0.11 -0.03 0.19 -0.30 0.98 0.03 0.10 1.00
LIN 0.70 0.63 -0.70 0.48 -0.19 0.20 -0.09 0.95 0.21 1.00
DIC -0.66 -0.61 0.54 -0.35 0.40 -0.53 0.32 -0.56 -0.54 -0.58 1.00
TGR 0.15 0.38 -0.27 -0.11 0.09 -0.13 -0.37 0.44 -0.15 0.34 -0.50 1.00
VOA 0.47 0.42 -0.31 0.43 -0.29 0.45 -0.48 0.49 0.41 0.47 -0.88 0.53 1.00
PLS 0.75 0.65 -0.56 0.31 -0.58 0.32 -0.05 0.44 0.35 0.45 -0.77 0.31 0.69 1.00
ROL 0.60 0.51 -0.48 0.51 -0.28 0.58 -0.37 0.68 0.57 0.68 -0.94 0.46 0.83 0.62 1.00
COC 0.72 0.61 -0.62 0.38 -0.40 0.41 -0.16 0.62 0.45 0.67 -0.90 0.42 0.69 0.65 0.87 1.003
Appendix: Figure 1
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